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Extending Life Cycle Models of Optimal Portfolio Choice:
Integrating Flexible Work, Endogenous Retirement, and
Investment Decisions with Lifetime Payouts
Previous research on portfolio choice and retirement patterns has evolved from three
sources. First, the finance literature has investigated how investors save and allocate their
portfolios across available capital market assets, typically safe bonds and risky stocks. 1 Yet
most of these studies are silent on the links between labor supply and investment behavior.
Second, a large Social Security literature has explored how older people alter their work
patterns in response to system retirement incentives, but that research devotes little attention
to saving and portfolio allocation patterns. And third, the longevity risk literature has
examined how annuity payout products can help protect against outliving one’s income, but it
has not yet explored how flexible labor supply might shape portfolio allocation and location
decisions.
The present paper seeks to unify these three strands in a model which integrates the
decisionmaking process of a consumer seeking to optimally select her saving, consumption,
work hours, retirement age, and investment patterns in a life cycle context, where she has
access to both the capital market (stocks and bonds) and annuities. We contribute to the
finance and pension literature by making the work/retirement decisions endogenous, as the
consumer can adjust both her retirement date and her employment hours during her worklife.
We also add value to the Social Security literature by making investment and annuitization
decisions endogenous to the lifecycle work and retirement choice. From an individual’s assetliability perspective, we show how stochastic equity returns, uninsurable labor income shocks,
and uncertain lifetimes help shape investment portfolio patterns.
This is not the first analysis that makes labor supply endogenous over the life cycle in
an investment context, 2 but we extend prior research by integrating flexible work hours and
retirement ages with uncertain mortality and uninsurable labor income paths to show how
they influence consumption, saving, and portfolio choice paths. Using our realistically
calibrated life cycle model, we derive optimal work and retirement behavior as well as
consumption and investment patterns over stocks, bonds, and payout annuities. Prior finance
studies have assumed fixed retirement ages and predict that older people hold unrealistically
high levels of equity; by contrast, we show that making labor supply endogenous and
allowing purchase of payout annuities reduces older persons’ equity share and substantially
1

See for instance Campbell, Chan, and Viceira (2003) and Chacko and Viceira (2006).
See for instance Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008), Polkovnichenko (2007), Chan and Viceira (2000) and
Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992).
2

2

increases work effort of the young – compatible with real-world evidence. We then illustrate
how introducing annuities generates even more realistic models which permit earlier
retirement and higher financial market participation by the elderly. Incorporating an agedependent leisure preference parameter is particularly interesting, as it generates a gradual
decline in work hours and equity holdings with age, and a sensible dispersion in retirement
ages which peak at age 62; these results are also consistent with empirical findings. 3
Our work thus contributes to the portfolio choice, Social Security, and longevity risk
management literatures. Many older finance research assumed that investors construct their
portfolios independent of labor market influences, though a few authors do allow uninsurable
labor income risk to shape household optimal consumption and investment decisions (Heaton
and Lucas 1997; Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005) and they show how the
optimal portfolio equity share falls with age due to the bond-like path of labor market
earnings. Nevertheless, those authors maintain the exogeneity of labor supply. A few studies 4
have embedded flexible work hours into a continuous time portfolio choice model, but they
assume, unrealistically, that the worker can fully insure labor income risk in the capital market
(i.e. that wages are perfectly correlated with a set of traded risky securities). A recent paper by
Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008) analyzes endogenous work hours over the life cycle in a
realistically calibrated portfolio choice discrete time model, but it requires the worker to
mandatorily retire at a pre-specified age. Prohibiting consumers from controlling their
retirement age is problematic, since working longer represents a key way in which older
workers can react to unlucky shocks in both labor and capital markets (Mitchell and Fields
1984). In addition, deciding when to retire and claim one’s Social Security benefits is one of
the most important yet irreversible financial decisions that people make. Particularly in this
current bear market, households may be able to hedge adverse capital market developments
by increasing their work effort and by working longer.
A large literature in the public finance arena explores how consumption, saving, and
work patterns respond to Social Security benefit incentives, but those studies do not devote
much attention to portfolio investment behavior. Instead, that research takes seriously the way
in which Social Security benefits depend on and/or influence retirement behavior. For
instance, Laitner (2003) analyzes the effects of Social Security taxes and benefits on
retirement ages, and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) offer an important empirical analysis of

3

See Gustman and Steinmeier (2005).
C.f. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992); Bodie, Detemple, Otruba, and Walter (2004); Dybvig and Liu
(2004); and Fahri and Panageas (2007).
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retirement patterns. 5 Low (2005) and French (2005) investigate optimal consumption, saving,
and labor supply patterns with stochastic and unspanned wages, but they abstract from the
portfolio allocation problem.
A last literature on which we build analyzes the impact of longevity risk on life cycle
portfolio management. These analyses demonstrate how investors chose between stocks,
bonds, and survival-contingent payout streams or payout annuities, so as to optimize their
saving and consumption patterns during retirement. 6 Two studies integrate annuities into a
realistically calibrated portfolio choice model (uninsurable labor income, uncertain life time,
stochastic capital markets, borrowing constraints) over the full life cycle, but they do not
endogenize the work hours or the retirement decision (Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos
2008; Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos 2008). Those authors demonstrate that annuities are
valuable in that they offer investors the opportunity to give up liquidity in exchange for a
survival-contingent premium known as the ‘survival credit.’ What remains to be done is to
develop a realistically calibrated model with uninsurable labor income, uncertain asset returns,
stochastic mortality, flexible hours, choice of retirement date, and variable as well as fixed
annuities in the portfolio choice set. To this task we turn next.

1. The Consumer’s Life Cycle Problem
1.1

Preferences
We employ a discrete time model t  0,..., T  1 , where t refers to the individual's

adult age (computed as actual age minus 19 assuming the relevant lifespan starts at age 20).
The individual has an uncertain lifespan and may live for a maximum of T years (indexed
from 1 to T). The parameter pts denotes the (subjective) probability of surviving to period t +
1, given the consumer is alive at t. In the last period, pTs 1 is equal to zero. Individual
preferences are characterized by a CRRA utility function u (C t , Lt ) 

1
1 

(C t1 Lt )1  defined

over a consumption good and leisure, where the substitution between leisure and
consumption takes the Cobb-Douglas form. 7
The recursive definition of the value function is given by:

5

Other studies focus on the empirical analysis of retirement patterns; see Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva
(2000) and Benítez-Silva and Heiland (2008).
6
See Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos (2009), Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2006), and Milevsky and
Young (2007); a broad literature review appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008).
7
Low (2005) uses this same formulation but his analysis of work patterns prior to retirement is silent on portfolio
choices. In sensitivity analysis below, we also evaluate the trade-off between leisure and consumption using a
modified Cobb-Douglas preference function as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008).
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. The parameter is the coefficient of relative risk

aversion, and  < 1 is the time preference. Here Ct denotes the level of consumption and Lt is
leisure at time t. Leisure is measured as a percent of available time and lies in the
interval Lmin  Lt  1 . The individual’s work hours are measured as a fraction of the total
available time, i.e. 1  Lt , whereas after retirement, labor supply is equal to zero. In what
follows, the minimum leisure time is set Lmin = 1/3; in other words, the maximal labor supply
is 2/3 of available time. Leisure preferences are governed by the parameter α, where (for

a higher value of α corresponds to an increasing (decreasing) marginal utility of leisure
(consumption). 8 Below we work with a fixed value for α, but in sensitivity analysis we also
permit α to be age-dependent, so declining health at older ages may induce a lower valuation
of leisure (c.f. Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva 2000). We abstract from bequests. 9
1.2

Labor and Retirement Income
Our model accounts for a flexible retirement age within the parameters generally

adopted by the US Social Security system. That is, the worker can retire (consume full
leisure) between the ‘early’ retirement age (ERA; set here to age 62) and the ‘latest’
retirement age (LRA; set here to age 70). The individual receives a real wage when working
and decides what fraction of her time to devote to the job. This labor supply decision ( 1  Lt )
then influences gross labor earnings. Labor earnings is reduced by a given fraction of
expenditures related to housing and other durables expenditures h(t). Also individuals must
pay taxes on their labor earnings (after housing expenditures) according to the proportional
rate t l . Thus after-tax disposable labor earnings during the work life (t < τ,   [62, 63,...,70] )
are given by:





Yt  (1  h(t )) 1  t l 1  Lt  expwt E t u t ,

E t  Et 1 nt ,

(2)

where wt  is a deterministic function of wage rates with respect to age allowing for the
8

In the special case where α is zero, this is consistent with the conventional utility function used in many prior
studies of life cycle portfolio allocation (c.f. Campbell and Viceira 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005;
Viceira 2001; and Yao and Zhang 2005).
9
Hurd (1989) estimates the strength for intentional bequest preference to be close to zero, and therefore
concludes that for most households bequest is accidential.
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empirically observed hump-shaped earnings profile. E t is a permanent labor earnings
component with innovation nt , and ut reflects a transitory shock uncorrelated with nt . The
logarithms of both nt and ut are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
standard deviation of  N and  U . The correlation between the permanent earnings and the
stock market is denoted by n. In our discrete time model, τ is the endogenous retirement age
which is treated as both a decision variable as well as a state variable, with nine possible
values from age 62 to 70.
After retirement, the household receives after-tax benefits payments from Social
Security defined as follows: 10

 K

  (1  L) exp wt  
 E F
, where
Yt  (1  h(t )) 1  t r  t 1
K
 , NRA


K









F , NRA  exp g 1  NRA   I   NRA   exp g 2  NRA   I   NRA 

(3)

and where ζ is the Social Security replacement rate based on lifetime average earnings. Here


1  L stands for the average fraction of available time worked during the work life. The

 K

  (1  L) expwt  
 where K denotes
average lifetime earnings level is approximated by  t 1


K





the period in which the individual attains her normal retirement age (NRA). Social Security
benefits are taxed at a rate t r which may be lower than the wage tax rate to account for
progressive taxation. I is an indicator function which identifies whether the individual retires
at or prior to the NRA, or later. F , NRA is a factor which depends on the NRA and the
endogenous retirement age  . If the worker retires prior to the NRA, F , NRA works as an
actuarial reduction factor permanently reducing benefit payments (here g 1 and g 2 are positive
constant). If the consumer works after the NRA, the benefit is increased by the delayed
retirement credit F , NRA . 11

10

Our model assumes that people claim retirement benefits and move to full leisure at the same age; Coile,
Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (2002) show that this is actually what most people do.
11
We abstract from other institutional aspects of Social Security rules such as the earnings test for retirees who
return to work after retirement.
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1.3 Capital and Payout Annuity Market Parameters
The individual may access capital markets by investing in two different asset classes:
riskless bonds and risky stocks. The real bond gross return is constant over time and denoted
by Rf . The real gross risky stock return at time t is labeled Rt and evolves according to a
geometric random walk with drift. This implies that the log-returns for stocks ln(Rt) are
serially independent and identically normally distributed with mean µs and standard deviation
σs. The return on assets is taxed at rate tc. We also include in the investment opportunity set
variable payout life annuities where the payouts may reflect an underlying portfolio of
equities or bonds (or both). These are insurance contracts between an annuitant and an insurer
where the purchaser pays the insurer an initial premium At and receives a pre-specified
number of fund units nt for life, conditional on survival. This is computed according to:
p a (t , s )

T

At  (1   ) Z (t )nt 1 (t ) 
a
t

s t 1

1  AIR s t 1

(4)

.

Here δ is an expense or loading factor charged by the insurance company to cover
s 1

administrative costs, and the price of a fund unit at time t is Z ta . Also p a (t, s)   pta is the
t

cumulative conditional survival probability for an individual age 19+t to survive until age
19+s, and AIR is the assumed interest rate. The single-period survival probability pta is
specified by a mortality table used by the insurance company and may differ from the
individual's subjective survival probability pts . This allows us to model asymmetric mortality
beliefs and address the problem of adverse selection in the private annuity market. The
survival-contingent income from the annuity is equal to P̂t  nt Z ta , t  1,..., T  . The AIR
determines how the number of fund units is supposed to change over time, according
t 1



1
 ; it may be thought of as the pre-determined shrinkage rate for the
to nt  n1 
 (1  AIR) 
number of fund units.
The process describing the value of the fund unit is as follows:
Z t 1  Z t Rta1 ,



(5)



where Rta1  R f   ta Rt 1  R f is the growth rate of the asset underlying the fund, and where
π

a

is the stock fraction chosen inside the variable annuity. The equation describing the

evolution of payouts for a specific annuity may be written as:

7

Pˆt Rta1
ˆ
Pt 1 
1  AIR .

(6)

This equation highlights that the annuity payment rises when Rta1 > 1+ AIR; it falls when
Rta1 < 1+ AIR; and it is constant when Rta1 = AIR. 12 The classical annuity with lifelong fixed

payouts results is a special case, whereby the portfolio inside the annuity is fully invested in
bonds (i.e. πa=0) and the AIR is set equal to the riskless interest rate (i.e. 1 + AIR = Rf).
1.4 Wealth Transition and Optimization
Each period, the household decides how to allocate its cash on hand, Wt, to bonds Bt,
stocks St, purchase of payout annuities At, and consumption Ct. The budget constraint
becomes:
Wt  St  Bt  At  Ct .

(7)

With this investment and consumption strategy, next period’s wealth Wt+1 is given by:
Wt 1  ( S t Rts1  Bt R f )(1  t c )  t c ( Bt  S t )  Pt 1  Yt 1

(8)

where Pt+1 is the sum of annuity payments received from all previously-purchased annuities.
Here Yt+1, which below we call labor income, is defined in equations (2) and (3) as labor
earnings prior to retirement, and Social Security benefits after retirement. The recursive
evolution equation for the sum of after-tax payouts from all previous annuities purchased can
be written as: 13
1
 P
 T
p a (t , s)  
t
  R f   ta Rt 1  R f  1 (1  t c )  1 ,
Pt 1  
 At  
s t 1 

 1  AIR
 st 11  AIR
 






 



(9)

The individual’s optimization problem is now to maximize the utility in (1) with
respect to the appropriate asset allocation between liquid bonds and stocks, illiquid annuities,
consumption, leisure, and the retirement decision:

max

Ct , Lt , S t , Bt , At , [ 62 , 63,..., 70 ]

Vt

(10)

We rule out short-selling in stocks and bonds and preclude the household from borrowing
against future labor, pension, and annuity income by imposing the non-negativity restrictions
12

A more detailed discussion of how AIR influence payout profiles appears in Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and
Stamos (2009).
13
Here the annuities are held in a non-tax qualified account and interest earnings are taxed as capital gains at a
rate below the tax rate on labor earnings but higher than the Social Security tax rate (i.e. tr < tc < tl). This is an
approximation to the exclusion ratio approach implemented by the US tax authority adopted for computational
simplicity; for more detail on annuity taxation, see Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (1999) and
Milevsky (2006).

8





At ,  ta , 1   ta , S t , Bt  0.

In our model, there are five state variables: cash on hand Wt, annuity payouts from previously
purchased annuities Pt, the permanent labor earnings level E t , retirement age τ, and age t. To
reduce the problem by one state variable we normalize the continuous state variables cash on
hand and annuity payouts with the permanent labor earnings component. Next we discretize
the (normalized) continuous state variables and solve the optimization problem by backward
induction in a four-dimensional state space. For computations, we use a 40(W )  30( P)  42(t )
grid space before and a 40(W )  30( P)  39(t )  9( ) after ERA. For each grid point we
evaluate the policy and value functions using Gaussian quadrature integration and cubicsplines interpolation.
1.5 Model Calibration
The individual’s lifespan is modeled from age 20 to 100 (T = 81). In our base case,
preference parameters are set to standard values in the life cycle literature, namely a
coefficient of relative risk aversion of ρ = 5 and a discount factor β = 0.97. The leisure
preference value  is set equal to 0.59 in the base case, which is the mean of the agedependent profile used in Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva (2000) and close to Laitner’s
(2003) value of 0.63. The one-period survival rate pts is calculated by the US 1996 population
2000 table for female. Later, in the sensitivity analysis, we vary both the preference parameter
for risk aversion and for leisure.
The analysis also sets the mean equity log-return at µs = 3.01% and the corresponding
volatility parameter σs = 19.34%, equivalent to a yearly expected gross real return of 1.05 and
standard deviation of 20.5%; the assumed real riskless rate Rf is 1.02, in line with current
expectations. The deterministic component of the wage rate process follows Fehr, Jokisch,
and Kotlikoff (2006), reflective of middle-income households. The standard deviations

 N and  u are equal to 10.95% and 13.89% (as reported in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout
2005, and used by Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira 2008). The correlation between stock
returns and permanent and transitory earnings shocks n is set to zero, consistent with
empirical evidence in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). Returns on assets are assumed to
be taxed at 20%; labor earnings are taxed at 30% following Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira
(2008). Housing-related expenditures are modeled as in Gomes and Michaelides (2005).
In the base case, the model assumes that the worker has a fixed labor supply of 8 hours
per day and works 5 days a week (this is relaxed subsequently). This is motivated by Laitner

9

(2003), who posits 112 waking hours per week, so a fixed 40-hour work week is equivalent to


roughly one-third (0.36) time (i.e. 1 - Lt = 40/112). The average labor supply 1  L is also set
equal to the same fraction. The Social Security benefit structure is similar to that in effect in
the United States. The benefit replacement rate ζ is set to 0.55 as per Mitchell and Phillips
(2006); the actuarial reduction rate for early retirement benefits is g1  0.0713 and the
delayed retirement crediting rate is g 2  0.077 as in Buchinsky, Rust, and Benitez-Silva
(2000). Social Security benefits are taxed at a rate of 15% as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira
(2008). To price the annuities, the assumed interest rate is set to 2%, the insurance loading
factor δ is 2.38% (in line with industry leaders such as Vanguard), and we use conditional
survival probabilities pta from the US 1996 female annuitant 2000 mortality table to account
for potential adverse selection in the voluntary annuity market.

2. Results
In what follows, we present three variants of our model so as to compare key
outcomes of interest including saving and investment patterns, annuitization purchases, work
hours, and retirement ages. First, we develop a base case where the consumer can elect her
retirement age endogenously but cannot adapt work hours per week and lacks access to
annuities. Second, we allow work hours to be endogenous; and finally, we introduce annuities
into the picture. To do so, we use the optimal feedback controls obtained from the stochastic
optimization model and compute expectations using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters is provided in Section 3.
2.1 Fixed Hours, Flexible Retirement, No Annuity
We analyze a moderately risk-averse worker (ρ=5) whose chooses her appropriate
consumption, investment, and labor supply strategy given a fixed workweek (i.e. 40-hour
week work) but able to select a retirement age endogenously. Figure 1 traces expected
consumption, labor income, and saving patterns by age, as well as the Cobb-Douglas function
of leisure and consumption F (C t , Lt )  C t1 Lt which enters the utility function. All values
are normalized by the worker’s first-year labor income. The results show that the household
saves until age 47; liquid assets peak at age 55 in expectation when they amount to about
eight times first-year labor income. Average labor income follows a hump-shaped pattern
until age 65 and falls substantially when most households claim Social Security benefits at the
endogenous retirement age. The consumption profile also drops sharply after age 65 and falls

10

thereafter, since households are willing to trade off purchased goods for leisure time once this
is feasible. Nevertheless, the Cobb-Douglas function F which combines consumption and
leisure is quite smooth over the life cycle, as should be expected. Note that in expectation, the
household would be anticipated to rationally exhaust its savings around the age of 80, relying
fully on Social Security benefits after that.
Figure 1 here
Figures 2 and 3 offer detailed insights into the household’s expected asset allocation
patterns by age and retirement choices. Panel A in Figure 2 indicates that, in this environment,
people will hold a very high fraction of their saving in stocks over the life cycle, conditional
on having certain minimal level of saving. Even at age 80, the equity percent is still 97%.
These equity fractions are considerably higher than reported in prior studies that do not allow
endogenous retirement (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005; Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira
2008). The reason is that, here, households will react to adverse stock market developments
by delaying retirement and saving more. Thus the inherent hedging possibility of labor supply
allows the household to take on more financial risk until the oldest possible retirement age,
70. Also in Panel B we show that the capital market participation rate of modeled households
decreases sharply with age. Panel B in Figure 2 shows that about half of the modeled
households (55%) participate in the capital market at age 70; by age 80, fewer than 10% do
so. Such high levels of equity holdings and low participation rates are actually not realistic for
the older population. For instance, the U.S. Social Security Administration (2009) reports that
about 55% of the 80+-population still receives income from assets which amounts to 10% of
total income. Most of the asset income results from interest payments, and only one fifth
receive any income from stocks. Therefore the model predicted market participation rates are
low compared to observed behavior, and equity fractions, conditional on participation, seem
high.
Figure 2 here
In Figure 3 we illustrate household work hours and retirement patterns. In this case, by
assumption, the consumer works a 40-hour week work until retirement. As Panel A shows,
labor supply patterns drop off as of the early retirement age of 62, and by age 66, all will have
fully retired. Panel B displays the fraction of people electing to retire at each age: the model
predicts that 14% will retire early, and the majority leaves at age 66.
Figure 3 here

11

2.2 Flexible Hours, Flexible Retirement, No Annuity
Next we allow the household to also choose its work intensity in the pre-retirement
period, whereby the maximal labor supply is 2/3 of available time; in our case this is
equivalent to a maximum of 75 working hours per week (i.e. 112*2/3). Results appear in
Figure 4, where we see that the household now saves much more than was true in Figure 1.
Liquid assets now peak at earlier (at age 54 vs. 55 in Figure 1) and higher, amounting to over
10 times first-year labor income. On average, consumption is higher early in the work life and
it falls after the normal retirement age; the function F is again smoothed over the life cycle.
Figure 4 here
Turning to equity market participation patterns, Figure 5 and Figure 2 are quite
similar: people still hold a surprisingly high fraction of their saving in stocks conditional on
participation in the capital market (5A) but few households actually hold stocks and bonds
after retirement (5B). Comparing Figure 6 with Figure 3 reveals much more striking
differences. The individual able to adjust her labor hours ends up working much more during
her younger years, and then she gradually curtails labor effort after middle age. Essentially,
she profits from working harder early in life, producing higher absolute saving and more
capital market returns. Also, sharply different from the prior case, virtually all households
work up to the normal retirement age; after that, households gradually reduce their working
hours.
Overall, endogenizing both the retirement age and work hours permits the consumer to
enjoy reduced hours at older ages, a pattern consistent with empirical evidence (Low 2005).
Therefore this second model generates a relative realistic labor supply pattern, though
predicted high equity holdings and low capital market participation patterns still appear
inconsistent with observed behavior.
Figures 5 and 6 here
2.3 Flexible Hours, Flexible Retirement, and Fixed/Variable Payout Annuities
In a third scenario, we allow the household to not only select her work intensity and
retirement age, but also to hold annuities as well as stocks and bonds. Figure 7 shows the
expected life cycle profiles for the case where payout annuities are available; in Panel A the
consumer may purchase fixed annuities, and in Panel B variable annuities. The results show
that saving levels in liquid stocks and bonds are lower than in the environment without
annuities shown in Figure 4. Now the consumer saves about 20% less at the peak of lifetime
saving since she has the opportunity to purchase annuities and receive the survival credit in
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later life. In the fixed annuity world, the worker will gradually purchase annuities between
ages 48 and 75; the buying peaks at age 62 (when she spends about 13% of first-year labor
income). Yet annuity payouts are not large, and in old age, people again live mainly on Social
Security benefits. By contrast, in the variable annuity world, consumers buy substantial
amounts of variable annuities from age 40 to 67, and the purchasing peaks at age 47 (now, at
190% of first-year labor income). Variable annuities then generate important levels of
retirement income flows above and beyond Social Security benefits.
Figure 7 here
Figure 8 depicts the household’s expected trajectory for the fraction held in liquid
stocks and bonds, and in the fixed annuity, subject to having certain minimal levels of
financial and annuity wealth. Panel 1A reports the expected trajectory for the fraction held in
liquid stocks, bonds, and the fixed annuity; while Panel 2A plots the expected trajectory for
the fraction held in stocks and bonds, inside and outside the variable annuity. As before,
liquid stocks are the most important investment vehicle early in life, but in midlife, the
individual switches gradually out of equities into fixed annuities (1A) beginning around the
early retirement age. By around age 80, the entire portfolio has been moved into fixed annuity
holdings to take advantage of the survival credit. When the consumer can buy variable
annuities, the same general pattern (2B) obtains but it begins much younger, at around age 45.
The reason is that the illiquidity inherent in the variable annuity can be offset by flexibility in
both working hours and the retirement age. Earlier purchases provide access to the survival
credit and expected equity returns earlier in life.
Panels 1B and 2B of Figure 8 show the fraction of households not participating in the
capital or annuity markets by age. While participation patterns by the young are virtually the
same as before, there is a striking difference among the older population. Now most do not
rely only on Social Security benefits; rather, they also receive income from purchased
annuities. This is very clear in the case of variable annuities (2B), where virtually all retirees
optimally annuitize a portion of their wealth.
Figure 8 here
Figure 9 traces out the pattern of work hours when annuities are available. Here we see
that work hours are similar irrespective of the type of annuity provided, and similar to those
without the annuity. Further, as before, people gradually reduce their working hours over
time. But there are substantial differences in retirement patterns, as is clear from the
retirement rate table. Without annuities, 11% of the workers retire at the age of 66 and some
still work until age 70 (6B). With fixed annuities, retirement begins as early as age 62 and
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18% have left by age 66; all have left the workforce by 68. Finally, with variable annuities,
the distribution is shifted even earlier, with 60% having retired by age 66 and all having left
by age 67. In the US context, fixed payout annuities have been the product most widely sold
in the past, with variable payout annuities growing in popularity only recently. Yet the evident
appeal of the variable payout product suggests that these are likely to become more popular as
the population ages.
Figure 9 here
Overall, then, people retire earlier because they can secure a “second income” from
their annuity purchases to supplement their Social Security benefits.

In this case,

endogenizing both work hours and retirement, and including annuities, the model generates
hump-shaped work hour patterns, elderly equity holdings similar to those observed in the real
world, and capital market participation patterns also consistent with empirical evidence.
2.4 Welfare Analysis
Next we examine the impact on consumer welfare of adding labor supply flexibility
and annuities to the opportunity set. 14 To do so, we show in Table 1 the changes in consumer
wellbeing in two ways: standard consumption-equivalent variations or relative utility gains
(Column a), and also gains relative to what consumer would be willing to give up as a percent
of her first-year labor earnings (Column b). Welfare gains are computed with reference to the
lifetime utility level of a consumer with fixed work hours and retirement age and who lacks
access to annuity markets appear in Row (0). 15 Row (1) depicts the case of a worker who has
fixed work hours but a flexible retirement age; this additional degree of freedom with respect
to leisure provides a rather substantial lifetime utility gain of 4.4%. This can also be measured
as a 50% gain in his first-year labor income, versus the reference case. In Row (2), the
worker can adapt both her work hours and her retirement age; relative to the reference case,
utility gains are even larger, at 6.6% of lifetime utility, equivalent to a 61% increase in her
first-year labor income. Rows (3 and 4) permit both flexible hours and retirement ages; in the
former case, only fixed annuities are available, and in the latter case, variable annuities are
also available. Here we see that utility gains rise further in a world with annuities compared to
Rows (1 and 2) where the annuity market is shut down; in the most flexible case, Row (4),
lifetime utility rises by 7%.
Table 1 here
14

Computational details appear in the Technical Appendix.
The consumption-equivalent variable in utility terms is a standard metric; we also present the worker’s first
year of labor income as a metric for the welfare change as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008).
15

14

In sum, the marginal benefit from having access to annuities is positive and important
in the life cycle context, as is labor market flexibility in the form of adjustable weekly hours
of work and retirement age. We note that these increases in lifetime utility are computed from
the vantage point of a 20-year old where labor market flexibility is a driver for boosting
forward-looking lifetime utility. Prior research has demonstrated that, for an individual on the
verge of retirement, access to annuities is similarly valuable (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky,
and Brown 1999; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2009).

3. Sensitivity Analyses
To assess how robust our results might be to alternative formulations of household
preferences, we next explore several alternative formulations of key utility parameters,
namely risk aversion and the value attached to leisure. Of particular interest are the effects on
labor supply, work hours, and retirement ages, summarized in Figure 10 and Table 2. In
addition, we evaluate the effects on asset allocation patterns and the likelihood of participating
in the capital and annuity markets, reviewed in Tables 3 and 4. In all instances, the benchmark
(Case 1) is designed so the worker may elect flexible work hours and retirement age, and she
also has access to stocks, bonds, and fixed payout annuities. Variants include Case (2) which
boosts leisure preferences (to α=0.8); Case (3) reduces the consumer’s risk aversion (to
and Case (4) where risk aversion is increased (to  In Case (5) we use a modified
Cobb Douglas (MDC) utility function which alters the relative weights on consumption and
leisure. Specifically, the argument of the utility function is specialized to Ft (C t , Lt )  C t Lt
where α is set to 0.9 as in Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viciera (2008). In Case (6) we make  agedependent to allow the utility of leisure to deteriorate with poorer health at older ages (as in
Rust et al. 2000). The leisure parameter (t) is given by =1-0.6/(1+t/50) where t is the
period. In addition we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion to , a value in line with
the economics literature. 16
Figure 10, Tables 2-3-4 here
Not surprisingly, labor supply patterns over the life cycle depend importantly on the
way in which the utility function is formulated in Figure 10. In the benchmark case of Figure
10, the average worker starts out working over 40 hours per week and in her mid-30’s she
peaks at just under 50 hours per week; thereafter work hours fall gradually until retirement in
her late 60’s. Everyone has retired after age 68 (Table 2). By contrast, the leisure-lover (Case
16

See Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) who argue that the typical values used in the finance literature seem
implausibly high.
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2) works only about half-time over her entire worklife and leaves employment as early as
possible; all such persons are fully retired by age 63. Work hours in Case 3 and 4 are quite
similar to those in the benchmark case, indicating that varying risk aversion does not much
influence hours. Yet there are substantially different retirement age outcomes: the most risk
averse consumer is also likely to work until forced out at age 70, whereas risk lovers have a
more dispersed retirement age distribution (Table 2). The pattern for Case 5 results in an
unrealistically high level of work effort over the life cycle, in that young and middle-aged
employees are predicted to work over 60 hours per week and must be forced to retire at age
70. Finally, Case 6 with the age-dependent utility of leisure parameter results in young
persons are taking on extremely high labor hour commitments, but their effort drops off as
health problems set in. Additionally they are likely to retire early, with the witdrawal pattern
peaking at age 62.
The portfolio implications of this robustness analysis are summarized in Tables 3 and
4. For instance, the leisure lovers (those who worked relatively little during their youth) also
tend to invest heavily in equity until late in life (Tables 3 and 4, Case 2). Those with lower
levels of risk aversion are, not surprisingly, much more likely to invest in equity and virtually
all are in the capital market even at older ages (Tables 3 and 4, Case 3); the natural
comparison is with the highly risk averse consumer in Case 4 who exits equities in favor of
annuities at a much younger age.

In Case 5, the asset allocation pattern seems quite

reasonable: the worker starts with a high equity allocation and gradually moves into safer
investments like bonds and annuities with age. We also note in Table 4 that this consumer has
a high probability of participating in the financial market. Yet this seemingly realistic life
cycle investment pattern stands in contrast to the unrealistically high and long worklife profile
noted above, for this specification of preferences. Case 6 investment patterns are more
consistent with priors, in that equity holdings are high for the young; during their 50’s, the
consumer is expected to switch into bonds and annuities and by age 65 to hold virtually no
risky assets. But now the work patterns are more realistic than the prior case, since effort
drops off with age as health deteriorates and they also retire early. In addition, the retirement
peak at age 62 is also quite realistic (Table 2). 17

4. Conclusion
This paper uses a realistically calibrated life cycle model to derive optimal work and
17

Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) note two spikes in actual retirement patterns for US households: a main one at
age 62, and a smaller one at age 65. Here we replicate two peaks, one at 62 and the secondary one at age 63.
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retirement behavior, as well as consumption and investment strategy, taking into account
stocks, bonds, and payout annuities. Prior portfolio allocation studies assume that the
retirement age is set exogenously and predict that older people will hold unrealistically high
levels of equity. Yet using prior studies’ parameters, we show that few older persons will
actually participate in the capital market at all, also incompatible with real-world evidence.
Making labor supply endogenous raises older persons’ equity share and substantially
increases work effort of the young; it also affords significant lifetime welfare gains of 7% or
more than 60% of first-year earnings. Introducing annuities then generates even more realistic
models which permit earlier retirement and higher participation by the elderly in financial
markets. Finally, our model with an age-dependent leisure preference parameter fits observed
behavior remarkably well, incorporating a gradual decline in work hours and equity holdings
with age, as well as a sensible dispersion in retirement ages which peak at age 62, consistent
with the evidence.
Evidently, combining work, investment, and lifetime payouts offers better and more
attractive ways to manage life’s many challenges. This is one reason that, though fixed payout
annuities have been more prevalent in the marketplace to date, we anticipate investmentlinked payout annuities will become more popular as Baby Boomers age.
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Figure 1: Optimal Expected Consumption, Labor Income, and Saving over the Life
Cycle: Fixed Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity
Markets. The graph displays expected consumption C, saving S, and labor income Y as a
multiple of first-year labor earnings over the life cycle. Also shown is the value F of the
Cobb-Douglas function entering the utility function. Notes: The household has a moderate
level of risk aversion  of 5 and a discount rate  of 0.97; the leisure preference parameter 
is 0.59. We use optimal feedback controls obtained from the stochastic optimization for a
female with maximum lifespan of age 100; expectations are computed from 10,000 Monte
Carlo simulations.
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Figure 2: Asset Allocation and Capital Market Nonparticipation Patterns by Age, Given
Fixed Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity Markets.
Panel A depicts the expected fraction of stocks and bonds over the life cycle, conditional on
having minimally positive saving. Panel B displays the fraction of households not
participating in the capital market by age. Notes: See Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Work Hours and Retirement Rates Over the Life Cycle Given Fixed Work
Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity Markets. Panel A
displays average hours worked per week from age 20 until 70 (the latest feasible
retirement age). Panel B reports the percent of people retiring at each age from 62 to 70.
Notes: See Figure 1.
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Figure 4: Optimal Expected Consumption, Labor Income, and Saving over the Life
Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity
Markets. The graph displays expected consumption, saving, and labor income as a multiple
of first-year labor earnings over the life cycle. Also shown is the value F of the Cobb-Douglas
function entering the utility function. Notes: See Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Asset Allocation and Capital Market Nonparticipation Patterns by Age, Given
Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and No Access to Annuity Markets.
Panel A depicts the expected fraction of stocks and bonds over the life cycle, conditional on
having minimally positive saving. Panel B displays the fraction of households not
participating in the capital market by age. Notes: See Figure 1.
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Figure 6: Labor Supply over the Life Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous
Retirement Age, and No Annuities. Panel A displays average hours worked per week from
age 20 until 70 (the latest feasible retirement age). Panel B reports the percent of people
retiring at each age from 62 to 70. Notes: See Figure 1.
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Figure 7: Optimal Expected Consumption, Labor Income, and Saving over the Life
Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, with Fixed/Variable Payout
Annuities. The graph displays expected consumption, saving, and labor income as a multiple
of first-year labor earnings over the life cycle. Also shown is the value F of the Cobb-Douglas
function entering the utility function. Notes: Annuities are priced using the US annuitant 2000
mortality table (AIR = 2%, loading factor 1.0238). See also Figure 1.
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Figure 8: Asset Allocation and Capital Market Nonparticipation Patterns by Age, Given
Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, with Fixed/Variable Annuities.
Conditional on having minimally positive liquid saving and expected present value of annuity
payouts, Panel 1A depicts the expected trajectory for the fraction held in liquid stocks and
bonds, and in the fixed annuity; Panel 2A plots the expected trajectory for the fraction held in
stocks and bonds, inside and outside the variable annuity. Panels 1B and 2B display the
fraction of households not participating in the liquid capital or annuity markets by age. Notes:
See Figure 7.
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Figure 9: Labor Supply over the Life Cycle: Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous
Retirement Age, with Fixed/Variable Payout Annuities. Panel A displays average hours
worked per week from age 20 until 70 (the latest feasible retirement age). Panel B reports the
percent of people retiring at each age from 62 to 70. Notes: See Figure 7.
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Figure 10: Labor Supply Patterns Over the Life Cycle for Alternative Utility Parameters
Given Flexible Work Hours and Endogenous Retirement Age, with Fixed Payout
Annuities. The Figure displays the average hours worked per week for six alternative utility
function settings. Case (1) is the reference case with a Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility function
where α equals 0.59 and ρ is 5. Case (2) has  set at 0.8, i.e. the investor prefers to have much
more leisure time. For Case (3), the investor becomes less risk-averse so ρ is 3, and more risk
averse in Case (4) where ρ is 10. In Case (5) we use a modified Cobb-Douglas (MCD) with α
set at 0.9 to capture a stronger leisure preference. For Case (6) we use an age-dependent  to
allow for a gradual decline in the utility of leisure associated with poorer health at older ages;
as in Buchinski et al. (2000). (t) is given by =1-0.6/(1+t/50), where t is the period. Notes:
See Figure 7.
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Work
Hours

Retirement Annuity
Age
Market

(0) Fixed
(1) Fixed
(2) Flexible
(3) Flexible
(4) Flexible

Fixed
Flexible
Flexible
Flexible
Flexible

No
No
No
Fixed
Variable

Relative
Utility Gains
(%)
(a)
Reference
4.4%
6.6%
6.8%
7.0%

Welfare Gain: % of
1st yr Labor
Income
(b)
Reference
49.5%
61.3%
61.4%
62.4%

Table 1: Calculation of Welfare Gains. This table reports utility gains as consumptionequivalent variations computed with reference to Row (0) which refers to the lifetime utility
level of a consumer with fixed hours and retirement age, and lacking access to annuity
markets. Rows (1 and 2) allow the worker to select a flexible retirement age but differ with
regard to work hour flexibility. Rows (3 and 4) have both flexible hours and retirement age,
but in the former case fixed annuities are available, and in the latter case, variable annuities
are available. The last column reports the fraction of the worker’s first year labor income he
would give up, in exchange for the additional lifetime flexibility that would make him
indifferent relative to the reference case. Notes: See Figure 7.
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α
ρ
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0
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Retirement Ratio (%)
(3)
(4)
α
ρ
α
ρ
CD
CD
0.59 3
0.59 10
22.4
0.3
15.6
0.3
8.6
0.2
6.1
0.1
6.8
0.1
6.2
0.3
7.3
2.3
8.3
7.0
18.8
89.4

α
0.9

(5)
ρ
MCD
5
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
1.1
1.2
96.3

α
vary

(6)
ρ
CD
3
49.6
24.6
12.8
6.5
3.3
1.7
1.5
0
0

Table 2: Retirement Rates for Alternative Utility Parameters Given Flexible Work
Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and Fixed Payout Annuities. The table shows the
stocks/bonds/annuities fraction at age 35, 50, 65 and 80 for the six alternative utility function
settings described in Figure 10. Notes: See Figure 10.
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(2)
α
ρ
CD
0.8 5
100.0
0
0

Asset Allocation (%)
(3)
(4)
α
ρ
α
ρ
CD
CD
0.59 3
0.59 10
100.0
98.9
0
1.1
0
0

Age

Fraction

35

Stocks
Bonds
Annuities

(1)
α
ρ
CD
0.59 5
100.0
0
0

50

Stocks
Bonds
Annuities

98.9
1.1
0

99.7
0.3
0

99.5
0.3
0.2

66.1
8.5
25.4

58.7
4.8
36.5

79.0
10.2
10.8

65

Stocks
Bonds
Annuities

94.5
0
5.5

97.3
0
2.7

76.5
0
23.5

43.8
1
55.6

32.1
0
67.9

59.1
0
40.9

80

Stocks
Bonds
Annuities

1.9
0
98.1

38.4
0
61.6

8.9
0
91.1

1.8
0
98.2

1.1
0
98.9

3.7
0
96.3

α
0.9

(5)
ρ
MCD
5
97.5
2.5
0

α
vary

(6)
ρ
CD
3
98.7
0
1.3

Table 3: Expected Asset Allocation Patterns for Alternative Utility Parameters Given
Flexible Work Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and Fixed Payout Annuities. The
table shows the stocks/bonds/annuities fraction at age 35, 50, 65 and 80 for the six alternative
utility function settings described in Figure 10. Notes: See Figure 10.
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α
0.59

(1)
ρ
5

CD

α
0.8

(2)
ρ
5

Mean
Standard Deviation

12.6%
17.3%

0.1%
0.1%

Mean
Standard Deviation

53.0%
17.1%

18.8%
15.5%

CD

Non‐Participation (%)
(3)
(4)
α
ρ
α
ρ
CD
CD
0.59 3
0.59 10
Young: Age 20‐29
9.7%
7.5%
17.4%
13.1%

α
0.9

(5)
ρ
MCD
5

α
vary

(6)
ρ
3

11.6%
21.5%

0.5%
0.5%

0%
0%

0%
0%

CD

Old: Age 65‐99
1.0%
0.8%

0%
0%

Table 4: Capital Market Nonparticipation Rates for Alternative Utility Parameters by
Age, Given Flexible Labor Hours, Endogenous Retirement Age, and Fixed Payout
Annuities. The top panel depicts the mean and standard deviation of nonparticipation for
young persons age 20 to 29 in the six alternative utility function settings described in Figure
10. The second panel shows results for nonparticipation rates for persons age 65-99. Market
participation rates are 100% for middle-aged individuals. Notes: See Figure 10.
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Technical Appendix: Calculating the Utility-Constant Equivalent Consumption Stream
(CE)
For each case, the expected lifetime utility from consumption and leisure at t=1 is given by:
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where Ct and Lt are optimized in each model variant. In each case, we calculate the constant
consumption stream CE for an investor with fixed work hours who retires at the normal
retirement age and who does not have access to annuities. This constant consumption stream
CE makes her as well-off in expected utility terms at age 20 as the leisure and consumption
stream that can be financed by the life cycle strategy. CE is defined as follows:
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